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ABSTRACT
Merger is examined as one possible strategy for an organization to
employ in managing environmental interdependence. Three types of merger
are identified: 1) merger to reduce symbiotic interdependence; 2) merger
to reduce commensal is tic or competitive interdependence; and 3) merger to
diversify, and avoid previous interdependencies. Patterns of industrial
merger behavior are examined, and it is seen that there Is a strong as-
sociation between patterns of resource exchange and patterns of merger
activity. Competitive mergers, and diversification are also considered,
and it is seen that the analysis of merger activity also permits explana-
tion of variations in the profitability of acquired firms prior to ac-
quisition.

MERGER AS A RESPONSE TO ORGANIZATIONAL INTERDEPENDENCE
The operations and decisions of organizations are inextricably bound
up with the conditions of their relevant environments. Cyert and March
(1963), in their simulation of a duopoly, trace the mutual adjustment of
one organization to the other one, and as part of their behavioral theory
of the firm, note that organizations attempt to establish a negotiated
environment. Hazard (1961) has also commented on the fact that businessmen,
at least, seek certainty, and how this is incompatible with some of the
requirements of the anti-trust laws. The impact of the environment on
the organization has been widely noted (Thompson and McEwen, 1958; Katz
and Kahn, 1966; Buckley, 1967; Evan, 1966; Dill, 1958; Thompson, 1967).
Thompson (1967, Ch. 3) has postulated that organizations attempt to manage
their external dependencies, or to control the relevant environment.
Writing from an open systems perspective also, Hawley (1950) recognized
the tendency for organisms to attempt to control their environments, and
he suggested that they employed a growth strategy. Katz and Kahn (1966)
speak of a growth dynamic, and relate this to the organization's require-
ments for certainty and survival, which are postulated to be enhanced
through growth. And Starbuck (1965) has also proposed that organizations
operate on their environments to make them more munificent.
We have, then, three distinct issues. First, there are the proposi-
tions by Thompson, Cyert and M^rch, Katz and Kahn and Starbuck (among
others) that organizations take actions to control or manage their en-
vironments, or at least their dependency on the environment. Secondly,
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there appears in the literature on organizations the pervasive theme of
the objective of growth. It can be seen (Katz and Kahn, 1966; Hawley,
1950) that growth is one mechanism for dealing with the environment.
However, there are other mechanisms for managing environmental dependency,
and also, there may be other motivations for organizational growth (c.f.,
Starbuck 1965). Finally, there is the issue of how to grow— internally,
or through merger, and also the simultaneous question of which areas in
the environment to expand into.
This paper presents some empirical evidence on patterns of industrial
merger activity. The evidence is not inconsistent with the conceptualization
of organizations attempting to manage their dependence on the environment.
However, the evidence is also not inconsistent with many of the other moti-
vations for organizational growth, and being confined to the topic of
merger, provides no guidelines as to when one strategy for dealing with
the environment will be used rather than another. Yet in focusing on the
question of where growth occurs, we are able to present some data which
explore this unexamined issue", and also are able to provide* some support
to a theoretical schema that can assist us in systematically exploring the
..
issues which have been raised in the literature on organizational growth
and management of the environment.
Strategies for Managing the Organization's Environment
If organizations do seek to manage their environments, to reduce un-
certainty, and to make them more munificent, there are several strategies
that may be employed. One is the strategy of co-optation, discussed by
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Selznick (1949) in his case study of the Tennessee Valley Authority.
Selznick realized that organizations must come to terms with their en-
vironments, and illustrated how co-optation was one mechanism of accom-
plishing this accommodation. Selznick saw co-optation as a dilemma,
however. For in coming to terms with the environment by absorbing repre-
sentatives of powerful groups onto the organization's governing boards,
the very real possibility was raised that the organization's original
objectives might be diverted. In fact, his study of the TVA demonstrates
how a very liberal, new deal organization, in meeting the threats of
local conservative agrarian groups, did in fact alter some of its ob-
jectives and operations. While the dilemma of central planning versus
local participation is a prominent theme in the work, the organization' a
accommodation with the local environment through the strategy of co-
optation is of particular importance to organization theory.
Zald (1967) related the composition of YMGA boards of directors in
Chicago to variations in the geographic location, and studied the con-
sequences for some measures of toard sffectiveness. He noted that the
recruitment of board members had both a supply and a demand component.
Community agencies, recruiting from the areas in which they were located,
might encounter problems in locating a supply of high wealth, high prestige
individuals to place on the borrd. Again there is observed the correspondenc -.
between the environment and the composition of the board of directors.
In addition to co-optation, long-term contracts may be used to sta-
bilize relations among organizations, and to eliminate some of the en-
vironmental uncertainty (cf. Guetzkow, 1966). And, as Macaulay (1963)
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has observed, there are many important non-contractual relations among
businesses, which may also serve to govern and stabilize interorganizational
relations. Guetzkow (1966) ha3 hypothesized that more formal arrangements
may grow out of informal interorganizational interactions which have been
found to be mutually satisfying. Perrow (1970) has provided some case
examples which illustrate the importance of business norms and values as
providing limits on behavior, and thus reducing uncertainty in the organi-
zation's environment. Thus, in addition to co-optation, long-term contracts
and social values and norms may operate to stabilize interorganizational
relationships, and reduce the environmental uncertainty. Of course, there
are also mechanisms of illegal collaboration, such as price-fixing cartels
and conspiracies. While these are obviously more difficult to study directly,
an illustration of the analysis of cartel behavior is to be found in MacAvoy's
(1965) empirical work on the railroad cartel operating out of Chicago in
the late 1800's. Pinfield, et al. (1970) have reviewed many of the arrange-
ments possible for mediating interorganizational relations, and Litwak and
Hylton (1962) have studied the development of coordinating agencies with
particular emphasis on the United Fund.
The Joint venture is yet another vehicle for interorganizational re-
lationships. Aiken and Hage (1968) studied the use of joint ventures among
community agencies, and postulated that the joint venture served the ob-
jective of providing additional resources for program development while
simultaneously maintaining the autonomy of the parent organization.
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The organization may attempt to use the power of the state to obtain
more favorable conditions in the environment. Stigler (1971) has noted
that the state can provide an organization with direct cash subsidies,
restriction of entry by competition, control over factors which affect
substitutes and complements, and the ability to legally fix prices. Or-
ganizations have long attempted to obtain favorable conditions through
political means (cf. Bauer, et al. , 1963; Hall, 1969). Zald (1970) has
identified two types of environments --political and economic. It is not at
all unreasonable to expect that organizations will use strength or power
developed in one environment to obtain more favorable conditions in the
other environment. There are many examples of the attempts to employ
political means to obtain more favorable economic conditions, such as
through the use of tariffs and import quotas.
Finally, there exists the possibility for organizations to deal with
uncertainty or interdependence by absorbing it completely, through merger.
Companies may employ merger as a means for integration, by merging either
forward or backward in the production process. This is an attempt to deal
1
with symbiotic interdependence (Hawley 1950) . Steel companies may merge
with coal producers, and oil companies may purchase systems of petroleum
distribution. Paper companies may buy lumber companies, or textile firms
may purchase fabric stores. Secondly, companies may purchase the com-
petition as a way of reducing competitive, or commensal is tic interdependence.
While this has been somewhat prevented by the anti-trust laws, there are
nevertheless a large number of horizontal mergers, or mergers between
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similar types of companies, each year. Finally, a firm may attempt to
handle interdependence through a merger or growth strategy of diversifi-
cation. If a firm is too dependent upon a portion of the environment for
absorbing its output, or for providing an important input, it may diversify
into other product or service areas, and thereby hopefully reduce its
dependence on the portions of the environment with which it previously dealt.
The attempted diversification efforts of many of the aerospace companies
provide examples of this strategy in operation.
Warren (1967) has summarized much of the discussion on interorganizational
coordination, noting that the specific means used may vary as conditions in
the interorganizational field vary. Also, he has developed a typology of
joint decision making, arranged along a dimension of inclusiveness, and
varying from the merged, or unitary organization, through coalitional and
confederative forms of interaction, to the mechanism of social choice as an
interorganizational decision-making method.
Merger, then, is just one possible strategy for managing the organiza-
tion's dependence with the environment. Merger may be pursued for objectives
of growth, of course, and growth per se may be part of a strategy of dealing,
with the environment. The intertwining of these issues make conclusive
resolution impossible until additional empirical evidence is presented.
The contribution of the empirical work reported here is to provide some
evidence of merger behavior which is consistent and compatible with the
conceptualization of merger as a response to organizational interdependence.
Before getting to this evidence, however, we will review some other treat-
ments of the merger phenomenon to determine what previous research has dis-
covered.

Merger Research
While mergers occur between governmental units, social service
agencies, hospitals (cf. Starkweather, 1971), and many other organizations,
the merger of business organizations has been the topic that has been the
most extensively treated. This is partially because mergers among economic
organizations are recorded by the Federal Trade Commission, which provides
a ready and accessible source of data. The difficulty is, however, that
theories of merger have been developed primarily by economists, which means
that they are primarily relevant for economic organizations. This has led
to only a relatively few, focused questions being asked, and to a neglect
of the development of a . theory of merger which is general izable across types
of organizations. Note that Thompson, Katz and Kahn, and Starbuck have
stated that organizations seek to manage their environments, or make them
more certain—not just business organizations. There is probably a great
deal to be learned, in fact, by comparing the merger behavior of organizational
types, but that task must await the development of better data bases as well
as more advanced theoretical conceptualizations.
The economists have essentially asked two quest ions --when do mergers
occur, and why do mergers occur. Nelson (1959) in a study of the episodic
nature of the occurrence of mergers, came to the conclusion that mergers
occur at times of favorable conditions in the capital markets. He writes,
"Empirical investigations of such factors as the rate of industrial growth,
the rise of technological innovation, and the growth of interregional trans-
portation indicate that they were not likely to have been important immediate
factors in the merger wave. .. .Peaks in the expansion of merger activity were
found to be closest in timing to those in industrial stock prices, stock
market trading and new business incorporations" (pp. 6-7).

Gort (1969) felt that mergers occurred because of discrepancies in
evaluations of the firm between the selling and the buying parties. These
discrepancies, he believed, were more likely to exist in times of rapid
technological change, and when there were speculative capital markets.
Gort stated that "forces which generate discrepancies in valuation are
decisive in determining variations in nerger rates both among industries
and over time" (p. 624). In an analysis carried out on Federal Trade Com-
mission data covering the period 1951 through 1959, Gort found that the
technical personnel ratio, productivity change, growth, and the concentration
ratio were each correlated with the merger rate.
Most analyses of merger behavior have attempted to demonstrate that
merger-active firms either were more profitable or were not more profitable
than firms that did not engage in as much merger activity. If the goal of
profit maximization, common in economic theory, is assumed, then the issue
of whether or not mergers enhance profitability becomes a central one.
Dewing (1921) analyzed 35 consolidations, and found that earnings diminished
after the consolidation, and had, moreover, been grossly overestimated
before the consolidation occurred. Livermorc (1935), in a study of 328
firms which had merged during the period 1890-1904, found that successful
mergers accounted for less than 50% of the total. Reid (1962) studied some
66 firms during the period 1950-1959, and found that the highest percentage
of very successful firms was in the group not involved in acquisitions.
Kelley (1967), working with a relatively limited sample of firms, concluded
that active acquirers were neither more nor less profitable than other com-
parable firms in their industry. Reid (1968), exploring the possible motives
for merger, has provided some evidence that mergers are made for growth
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objectives, and that merger-active firms are actually less profitable
than others in the same industry. Mueller (1969) has also hypothesized
that mergers are made for growth. Finally, Hogarty (1970), studying 43
firms and utilizing stock market price as a measure of merger success,
also was forced to conclude that merger active firms were at least not
superior to those who were not active, as measured by increases in the
value of their common stock.
After at least fifty years of research, it seems that if mergers
are made to increase profitability or share price, they are not particu-
larly successful in doing so. This may be because the price of good
companies to be acquired is high enough so that no post-merger excess
profits can be realized. In any event no study has examined the pattern
of merger behavior, or which companies are acquired by whom in mergers,
though Gort (1969) did analyze the type of company doing the acquiring.
We shall hypothesize, following Cyert and March (1963), Thompson (1967),
Katr. and Kahn (1966), and Starbuck (1965), that mergers are an attempt
on the part of organizations to reduce uncertainty and manage their en-
vironments. This perspective is generalizable across organizational types,
consistent with the results, or lack thereof, of the literature cited, and
focuses attention on patterns of merger activity, in which both the acquired
and acquiring firms are analyzed. The evidence consistent with this hy-
pothesis is presented below.
Patterns of Merger Activity
The merger data utilized in this study were drawn from the Federal Trade
Commission's Report on Large Mergers in Manufacturing and Mining, 1948-1969
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(Federal Trade Commission, 1970). Mergers of manufacturing companies
with other manufacturing companies were analyzed, with the exception that
mergers of petroleum refiners with producers of natural gas and crude oil
were included. The data included a total of 854 mergers, representing the
2
acquisition of some $44.9 billion in assets over the period.
We have hypothesized that mergers are organizational responses to
environmental interdependence. While there are many resources of concern
to organizations, we have focused the analysis on resources that are ex-
changed for money. Levine and White (1961) have developed the concept of
exchange as a means of analyzing interorganizational behavior. The measures
of resource interdependence we employed were derived from Leonteif 's (1966)
input-output tables, showing transactions among sectors of the economy. Re-
source exchange measured in these terms permits a test of the hypothesis
which states that mergers will tend to be with organizations with which the
given focal organization is relatively more interdependent. Using inter-
dependence data on this aggregate level, of course, requires a comparable
aggregation of the merger data. Therefore, the analysis to be presented
is based on a classification of merger by the 20 two-digit Standard Indus- ,
trial Code classifications. Clearly, one extension of the present analysis
would be to obtain company by company transactions data, and to conduct the
analysis on this basis.
The classification of both acquired and acquiring company as to their
role in the merger, and by industrial sector is done by the Federal Trade
Commission. While there are probably errors and difficulties in the classifi-
cation, these are unrelated to the specific study to the extent that these
judgments are not made by the author.
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Two matrices were constructed representing patterns of merger
activity—one based on the number of mergers, the other based on the
assets involved. In these tables, the horizontal row represented the
acquiring industry, and the column the industry of the company that was
acquired. The raw data were converted into percentage terms, so that
each table read across as the percentage (by number or assets) of ac-
3
quisitions made by industry x that were with industry y.
Considering the Leonteif input-output tables, three measures of
resource interdependency were defined. On a comparable two-digit manu-
facturing industry basis, we derived measures of 1) the percentage of an
industry's output sold to a given other industry; 2) the percentage of an
industry's input purchased from another manufacturing industry; and 3) the
percentage of the industry's total transactions that occurred with a given
4
other industry.
Based upon the conceptualization of merger as absorption behavior
occurring in response to conditions of organizational interdependence, we
can propose the following relationships:
Let
x.. - the percentage of the total number of mergers of industry
i that were with industry j
x' = the percentage of the total assets acquired by industry i
that were in industry j
t
, ,
= the percentage of industry i's sales made to industry j
t' * the percentage of industry i's purchases made from industry j
tt = the percentage of industry i's total transactions that are
with industry j.
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Then, we have hypothesized that
x
ij
= a + b
l'lJ
+ Vij + b3 tt: ij + u < X >
x
l j
+ a
'
+ b
i
t
i j
+ b
2
c
ij
+ b3"iJ + u <2)
where u is a random disturbance term. We are not, a priori certain which
measure of resource interdependency is most responsible for merger behavior.
We shall also consider three alternative hypotheses to the notion that
merger is a response to resource interdependence. The first is that mergers
occur on a random basis. Because there are differing numbers of large firms
in different industries, the observed patterns of merger behavior would not
be equal across industries even if mergers were occurring randomly. In other
words, the supply of potential merger candidates large enough to be reported
in the FTC series differs across industries. Data on the number of firms with
assets over $10 million were collected from the Internal Revenue Service
Statistics of Income for several different years. Because of the high cor-
relation between the figures for different years, we choae one year, 1958,
as the year from which data would be collected for the analysis. This year
is approximately at the mid-point of the time period being considered. The
variable n
,
or the number of firms in industry j, was then introduced as a
J
controlling factor in the analysis.
A second alternative is that profitable industries are likely to attract
firms interested in acquisitions. Industry profitability, in terms of the
rate of return earned on equity, was included as a controlling factor. We
denote the profitability of industry j by p .

13-
Finally, the concentration, as measured by Weiss (1963) for each
industry was employed as an alternative variable. It was thought that
concentration might be a surrogate for difficulty of entry into an
industry, and lhat the variable also reflected important characteristics
of industrial structure. The concentration measure is denoted by c .
Analysis of the Merger Data
The results of the analysis of merger as a correlate of organizational
interdependence are quite striking. Considering all manufacturing indus-
tries at once, the following simple correlations were observed.
t t' tt p n <•
y__ y y i 1 J
x
ij -65 .62 .66 .01 .16 .01
i
x
ij -59 .52 .57 .03 .21 .04
The Pearson correlations with all of the transactions measures for either
the number of mergers or the assets merged were significant at less than
the .001 level, while correlations with either the profit rate variable or
the concentration ratio were not significant. The correlation with the
number of firms in the industry in which the acquisition was made was sig-
nificant at less than the .01 level, but the magnitude of the correlation
is significantly less than those for the transaction variables. 5

14-
As defined, tt., is highly correlated with the other two transactions
variables, t,, and t* . However, it turns out that these two variables
ij ij
are also highly correlated with each other, or the percentage of an in-
dustry's sales to a given other industry is highly correlated with its
purchases from that industry. In fact, t . is correlated .67 with t'
,
and .88 with tt.,, while t* is correlated .93 with tt... Utilizing a
step-wise regression analysis of x,,, the percentage of mergers by number
that were with a given industry, t,, alone accounts for 41.87. of the vari-
ance, while adding t' accounts for an additional 5.9%, and the further
addition of tt accounts for only an additional 1.5% of the variance.
If we are only interested in the total predictive value of the transactions
variables, we can disregard the issue of multi-collinearity, and note that
the three variables together account for 49.2% of the variance in x...
Looking next at x!,, or the percentage of mergers by assets that were
acquired by industry i in industry j, a stepwise regression analysis in-
dicates that t
,
, alone accounts for 35% of the variance while the addition
of tl. accounts for an additional 2.8% of the variance and the addition
of tt.. accounts for a further 1.6% of the variation. The three variables
together account for 39.4% of the variation in x' .
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For 18 of the manufacturing industries in which there were enough
total mergers to make the results meaningful, we can present data showing
how strongly correlated the transactions measures were with the observed
patterns of merger behavior, and also the correlations with the other three
variables. These results are presented in Tables 1 and 2. Table 1 presents
the results for the analysis of the percentage of mergers by number, while
Table 2 presents the analysis for the percentage of assets acquired in the
various industries.
Table 1 about here
Table 2 about here
In virtually all cases, there are statistically significant correlations with
at least one measure of resource interdependence, and in every case, or in
108 instances in the two tables, the correlations are in the expected positive
direction. None of the other variables do nearly as well in explaining pat-
terns of merger behavior on an industry by industry basis. If we take the
arithmetic average of the correlations over the 18 industries between x .
and x! . and the various factors considered, we can develop the following
table.
'il
£
ii "n P 1
n
1
C
1x
ij
.75 .71 .77 .04 .19 .02
x'
ij .70 .65 .71 .06 .24 .05
where tj. is the percentage of industry i*s sales made to industry J, t' is
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the percentage of industry i's purchases made from industry j, tt.. is th
percentage of industry i's total transactions with industry J, p. is the
profit rate of industry J, n is the number of large firms in industry j,
c. is the concentration of industry j, x . , is the percentage of mergers by
number of industry i with industry j, and x! . is the percentage of industry
i's acquisitions by total assets that were with industry j.
Mergers Within the Same Industry
When we consider only mergers within the same two-digit Standard In-
6
dustrial Code category, the model is put to its severest test. First of all,
firms tend to have relatively more transactions within the same industry, and
have also tended to merge relatively more frequently with other firms in the
same industry. Therefore, it is possible that this clustering of data points
is spurious, and has produced artificially good results.
There is also the alternative that mergers occur based upon informs Lie
or patterns of familiarity with the operations of the industry in which the
acquisition is being made. Interdependence, in the sense of resource exchange,
can certainly tend to increase familiarity between the exchange partners, and
to that extent, it is impossible to separate the effects of familiarity from^
the effects of transactions interdependence. However, in considering only
mergers within the same industry, we can more plausibly assume a constant
degree of familiarity within each industry. Differences in within-industry
merger rates can then more confidently be attributed to variables other than
familiarity.
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The correlations between the measures of merger patterns and the re-
source interdependency measures, as well as the control variables, for the
20 data points representing mergers within the same SIC, are presented below:
\1 eij "i1 P 1
n
i
C
1
x
ij .22 .46* .36* -.30 .38*
-.14
x' .35* .33* .34* -.17 .42* -.06
The asterisk again represents statistical significance at less than the .05
level. While n is significant and in the expected direction, n, is not
correlated with any of the resource interdependence measures, and hence their
significance is maintained when combined with n in a multiple regression
analysis. Measures of resource interdependency are important in analyzing
differences in the percentage of mergers that occur within the same two-digit
industry group. Five of the six correlations are significant at the .05 level,
and all are in the expected direction.
In considering mergers within the same industry group, we are studying
mergers that may be occurring to reduce either symbiotic interdependence, or
competitive or commensal is tic interdependence. We would expect the relation^
ship between economic concentration and the reduction of competitive uncertainty
to follow an inverted U-shaped relationship. At very low levels of industrial
concentration, there are many firms active in the market, and there is no small
group of them that truly dominate the environment. Merger under these condi-
tions reduces uncertainty very little, because any given firm accounts for so
small a proportion of the competition. On the other hand, at very high levels
of concentration, a great proportion of the industry's output is in the control
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of a few large firms. Under these circumstances, uncertainty can, perhaps,
be reduced through tactics such as price leadership or other forms of inter-
firm communication, because the behavior of only a few major competitors
must be monitored and predicted. Stigler (1964) analyzed oligopoly behavior
based on information theoretic considerations. He noted that with very few
firms, the probability of detection of deviations from standard industry
practice would be much greater. Furthermore, as concentration in the in-
dustry increases, prohibitions against horizontal mergers are more likely
to be vigorously enforced, which would again contribute to a decline in the
number of mergers within the same industrial category.
From a graphical analysis, it was determined that a value of approxi-
mately 40% for the concentration ratio appeared to be the peak of the inverted
U. Therefore, a variable representing the absolute value of the industry's
concentration less 40% was defined, and related to the percentage of merger
activity occurring within the same two-digit SIC. This variable, difcon .,
was correlated -.38 with x... and -.39 with x', both correlations in the
expected direction statistically significant at the .05 level. While this
variable was uncorrelated with any of the measures of resource interdependence,
it was highly correlated with the number of firms, n.. This correlation
J
explains the previously reported signficant correlations for this control
variable.
When the two independent measures of resource exchange, t
.
. and t'
,
and difcon are combined in a single regression equation, 37.8% of the
variance in the percentage of number of mergers within the same industry
classification, and 35% of the variance in the percentage of assets acquired
within the same industry can be explained.
..
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Diversif ication
In our earlier discussion of merger as a strategy for dealing with
organizational dependence on the environment, we noted that there were
three types of mergers that were relevant: 1) mergers to absorb symbiotic
interdependence, or mergers for vertical integration; 2) mergers to absorb
commensal is tic interdependence, or horizontal mergers to absorb some of the
competition; and 3) mergers for diversification, or mergers to avoid either
type of interdependence by diversifying the activities of the organization.
Having now discussed some evidence on the first two types, it remains to
consider some evidence on diversification.
Diversification is a strategy for avoiding interdependence, and is
likely to be utilized when due to either monetary or statutory constraints,
absorption of the external interdependence is not possible. Diversification,
then, will also be systematically related to the percentage of resources
exchanged with some important external organization. If there is no inter-
dependence, there is no need for diversification. The one organization
that would most clearly meet all the conditions hypothesized to generate
an avoidance strategy for managing dependence is the government. The
government can not be absorbed , and co-optation does not eliminate the
threat of changes in the levels of appropriations. We would therefore
postulate that firms, or industries, which did a great deal of business with
the government, would engage more frequently in diversification for reducing
interdependence.
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Gort (1962) has studied diversification and integration in American
industry, and has developed an index of the extent of diversification for
13 manufacturing industries. Correlating these index numbers with the
percentage of business done with the Federal government, and with govern-
ments on all levels, we obtained the following results. The percentage of
business done with the government was correlated -.55 with the percentage
of business done within the same industrial category, a result which is
statistically significant at the .03 level with the small sample size being
used. And, the extent of diversification was correlated .58 with the per-
centage of business done with the Federal government, a result which is
significant at the .02 level. What this means is that diversification,
measured by the extent to which the firm's business is done with products
outside of those in its primary classification, is positively related to
the percentage of business done with the government, as determined on the
industry level of analysis. Industries that do relatively more of their
business with the government tend to have higher measures of diversification,
or sell a lower proportion of products in the primary industrial group.
To the extent, then, that diversification is prompted by doing a
large percentage of business with the government, we should be able to
account for the variation in the correlation coefficients obtained when
we predicted merger behavior based on an absorption strategy for reducing
interdependence. To the extent that industries doing a large percentage
of their business with the Federal government were merging not to absorb
interdependence, but to diversify away product market interdependence,
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correlations in these industries should be relatively lower. When the
transactions correlation coefficients themselves were correlated with the
percentage of business done with both the Federal government and with
government in total, the results were consistently in the expected direction,
but were not significant, partially because the sample size was limited to
the 18 industries being studied. Of the twelve possible correlations (each
of the three transaction interdependence measures with each of the two
percentage sales measures), ten were in the expected negative direction,
meaning the more business that was done with the Federal government, the
less well the model that accounted for only the absorption strategy worked
in explaining merger behavior.
Profitability of Acquired Firms
Finally, we can consider the profitability of the acquired firm, in the
year prior to acquisition, and determine whether the conceptualization of
merger as a response to organizational interdependence can assist in analyzing
these data. The Federal Trade Commission has published profitability levels
of companies acquired in various types of acquisitions (Federal Trade Com-
mission, 1969), for those cases where the assets of the acquired company
were $25 million or more. The table covers mergers in manufacturing and
mining for the years 1950-1968, and represents data from 401 mergers. Based
upon our conceptualization of merger as either part of an absorption or an
avoidance strategy, we can make some predictions about the profitability of
mergers undertaken for either of the two reasons.
We have identified two reasons to merge. One reason for merging is to
reduce resource interdependence by absorbing that interdependence, either by
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acquirtng competitors who are fighting for similar resources or markets,
or by acquiring suppliers and customers who are vertically related to the
organization in the input and output exchange relationships. The second
reason for merging is to reduce interdependence by diversifying into other
activities, so that the organization's reliance on a particular set of
organizations in its environment is reduced. While organizations probably
do desire to acquire profitable ventures, other things being equal, we
can see in operation a set-defining search rule. If a firm is merging under
the absorption strategy, the set of firms in which it can make its acquisition
is, by definition, limited to those in resource areas with which the firm is
interdependent. On the other hand, diversification permits inclusion in
the considered set of many other firms besides those which are interdependent
in a resource exchange sense with the focal organization. It is not un-
reasonable to expect, then, that strategies of diversification will permit
the inclusion of more potential merger candidates. And as a consequence of
the larger set of considered alternatives, diversification mergers will tend
to be with firms that are more profitable prior to the acquisition.
In Table 3 we have reduced the Federal Trade Commission data to show
the rate of return earned by two sets of acquired companies-- those acquired
Table 3 about here
in horizontal or vertical mergers, which are mergers for absorption, and
those other mergers, made for diversification. An analysis of the table
using a Chi-square contingency analysis confirms at the .02 level of sig-
nificance that we are forced to reject the null hypothesis that the profit-
ability of firms acquired for absorption is equivalent to that of firms
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acquired for diversification. Inspection of the results indicates that
they are in the predicted direction.
Conclusion
The pattern of mergers among industrial companies has been analyzed
as a response to organizational interdependence. It has been shown that
there exist statistically significant associations between patterns of
resource exchange and patterns of merger activity, and that these as-
sociations are able to account for about one-half of the variation in
merger behavior. Merger, when conceived as a response to organizational
interdependence, is then a strategy to be examined along with other strategies
that can be utilized in managing the organization's environment, and also is
a strategy that can be analyzed in a consistent conceptual framework across
types of organizations.
We have specified three types of merger behavior: 1) merger to absorb
symbiotic interdependence; 2) merger to absorb competitive or commensalistic
interdependence; and 3) merger for diversification, or merger to avoid
existing interdependencies by reducing them. Data on all three types of
merger behavior have been examined, and by following this mode of analysis,
we have even been able to partially account for observed variations in the
strength of our correlational results. The confidence in the conceptual
schema developed is thereby strengthened, because not only can it explain a
significant amount of the variation in merger behavior, but it can even be
employed to predict when it will work well or poorly in the job of explanation.
As we have stressed throughout, merger is only one form of organizational
linkage, and is at one end of Warren's (1967) continuum of inclusiveness.
.i if )") r";
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The task remains to relate the various strategies for managing the en-
vironment to each other over time, and to conditions in the interorgani-
zational environment that might explain the use of one rather than another.
The task also remains to examine growth, apart from merger, as a strategy
for managing the environment, and to specify the environmental conditions
that will tend to produce strategies of diversification or integration.
"
FOOTNOTES
The concept of symbiosis has been defined in the human ecology literature
as "a mutual dependence between unlike organisms" (Hawley, 1950, p. 36).
2
During the period studied, there were 1,417 total mergers in manufacturing
and mining involving firms with assets of over $10 million. These mergers
accomplished the acquisition of $63.7 billion in assets. However, there
are many other types of mergers not covered either by the particular FTC
report, or by the study. There are mergers that are large and involve
companies in industries besides mining and manufacturing such as retailing
the services, or finance. And, there are the many smaller mergers that
occur.
3
These tables are available upon request.
4
These tables are available upon request.
These particular correlations are higher for a simple linear correlation
than for correlations on various non-linear transformations of the vari-
ables, though in no case is the difference particularly large. As the
theoretical basis for the study has only predicted a relationship, without
specifying shape, it is interesting to note that a simple linear fit pro-
vides the best results for these data.
During the period studied, there were 373 mergers between firms that were
in the same 2-digit industry classification.
According to the Federal Trade Commission (1970), approximately 16.17. of
the total number of mergers in mining and manufacturing during this period
were of a horizontal variety, or were likely to be for the purposes of
reducing commensal is tic interdependence; 13.3% of the mergers were verti-
cal, or to absorb symbiotic interdependence; and 70.7% of the mergers were
classified as conglomerate, or as tending to further diversification. This
classification is both arbitrary, and not relevant to the analysis under-
taken in this paper, however. The fact that transactions interdependence,
which is a symbiotic relationship, accounted for so much of the variation,
provides some evidence that there is considerably less conglomeration than
is customarily believed.
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Table 1
Correlations of x . . (percentage of total
mergers of industry i with industry J) with
Transactions and Other Variables for Separate
Manufacturing Industries
Industry
Food
Textile
Apparel
Lumber
Paper
Printing
Chemicals
Petroleum
Rubber
Leather
Stone, Clay,
and Glass
Primary Metals
Fabricated Metals
Machinery
Electrical
Machinery
Transportation
Equipment
Instruments
Miscellaneous
Manufacturing
11 1L
tt
ii A
l± 11
.98**
.67**
.93**
.76**
.86**
.98**
.96**
.
68**
.32
.88**
.80**
.81**
.46*
.96**
.91**
.61**
.61**
.31
.95**
.94**
.74**
.60**
.98**
.53**
.98**
.73**
.22
.86**
.95**
.99**
.15
.78**
.85**
.63**
.56**
.29
.97**
.86**
.91**
.69**
.96**
.78**
.97**
.82**
.36*
.88**
.95**
.95**
.31
.91**
.93**
.63**
.67**
.38*
-.13
-.52
-.72
.09
.13
.20
.28
.03
.26
-.73
.30
.07
.29
.24
.29
.34
.21
.04
.56**
.07
-.18
-.05
.12
.03
.38*
.01
.16
.36
.25
.33
.49**
.52**
.39*
.46*
.21
.07
.00
-.26
-.46*
-.35*
-.10
-.16
.24
.20
.37
-.38*
.22
.31
-.01
.08
.20
.36
.14
.10
* represents significance at less than the ,05 level in the expected direction
** represents significance at less than the .01 level in the expected direction
;s.
Table 2
Correlations of x!. (percentage of total assets
acquired by industry i that were in industry j)
with Transactions and Other Variables for Separate
Manufacturing Industries
Industry c
ij 'ij tt, , P 1 °i
C
1
Food .98** .96** .98** -.11 .60** .00
Textile .64** .78** .78** -.58 .28 -.27
Apparel .86** .86** .97** -.74 -.14 -.46*
Lumber .44* .24 .34 .11 .04 -.19
Paper .81** .95** .92** .12 .16 -.00
Printing .97** .52** .77** .18 .01 -.18
Chemicals .91** .96** .94** .31 .38* .29
Petroleum .86** .31 .43* .22 -.02 .31
Rubber .19 .34 .40* .24 .43* .42
Leather .91** .88** .90** -.70 -.36 -.36
Stone, Clay,
and Glass .64** .90** .83** .32 .35* .21
Primary Metals .78** .98** .93** .08 .35* .32
Fabricated Metals .48* .03 .22 .31 .44* .05
Machinery .95** .77** .90** .28 .58** .16
Electrical
Machinery ,92** .77** .90** .30 .46* .18
Transportation
Equipment .73** .83** .80** .34 .46* .36
Instruments .48* .27 .44* .22 .37* .07
Miscellaneous
Manufacturing .08 .29 .26 .16 -.02 .00
* represents significance at less than the .05 level in the expected direction
** represents significance at less than the .01 level in the expected direction

Table 3
Profitability of Acquired Companies, Asset
Size of $25 Million or More, in the Year
Prior to Acquisition, 1950-1968
Profitability
(rate of return
on equity)
Horizontal and
Vertical Mergers
Conglomerate and
Product Extension
20% and over
15% - 20%
10% - 15%
5% - 10%
0% - 5%
Not profitable
6 companies
12
38
45
21
11
13 companies
44
92
83
31
5
Total companies 133 268
f!;0.';; t
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